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LABOR LAW
Discrimination Bans Demonstrate
Approaching Maturity of Employment Law
By Theodore 1. St. Antoine
T he pervasive message of this sym-posium sponsored by the Labor Re-
lations Law Section, whether or not in-
tended by the individual authors, is that
American employment law is moving
beyond adolescence and may be ap-
proaching maturity.
Early adolescence, at least on a
nationwide scale, was ushered in by
such New Deal legislation as the
Wagner Act, the original National
Labor Relations Act1 which guaranteed
workers in most industries the right to
organize, and which regulated the ac-
ivities of unions and employers in
dealing with one another.
During the past two decades, how-
ever, the spotlight shifted from the in-
stitutional relationships of management
and organized labor and focused much
more on the needs and concerns of the
individual employee in the workplace.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,2 the Age Discrimination In
Employment Act,3 the Vocational Re-
habilitation Act, 4 state statutes parallel-
ing and augmenting that federal legisla-
tion, and recent, widespread modifica-
tions in the common law doctrine of
employment at will,5 are all manifesta-
tions of this sharply heightened sen-
sitivity to individual rights.
No society can claim that it h* at-
tained full maturity until it has eradi-
cated all invidious discrimination
among its members, including reliance
on irrelevant employee characteristics
in making job decisions. The articles
that follow attest, albeit indirectly, that
we have made substantial progress to-
ward that goal.
Theodore J. St. Antoine is
,James E. & Sarah A. Degan Profes-
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tions Law and Chairperson of the
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The primary substantive emphasis
in these pieces Is not on race, the one
quality which bears no functional rela-
tion to the capacity to perform a job,
but rather on sex, age, and handi-
capped status - all factors which in
certain circumstances may implicate
bona fide occupational qualifications.
While Sheldon Stark analyzes a num-
ber of cases Involving alleged racial dis-
crimination, it is for the purpose of
demonstrating methods of proof In dis-
crimination cases generally, not for the
purpose of conveying any lesson about
race as such.
From all this emerges a profound
message about the nature of discrimi-
nation itself, part of it encouraging and
part of it disquieting.
The Congress that passed the Civil
Rights Act in 1964 probably believed
that the major vice to be remedied was
discrimination in its classic sense - a
deliberate, calculating, malicious, de-
meaning exclusion of blacks, women,
and other minorities from employment
or from preferred positions In employ-
ment. Today that problem is well on
the way to solution.
A knowledgeable acquaintance
who has been close to the EEOC
(Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission) enforcement operation since
its inception estimates that less than ten
percent of the Commission's litigation
now involves truly intentional discrimi-
nation - so-called "disparate treat-
ment. " That is good news indeed. De-
spite all the pessimistic forebodings, law
has been able to elevate people's mor-
ality - or at least their behavior.
Sadly, there is another, bleaker
side to the picture. The dreary statistics
are familiar to everyone who works in
this field, and I shall not rehearse them
at any length. It is enough to observe
that after two decades of federally en-
forced nondiscrimination in employ-
ment, racial minorities are still twice as
likely as whites not to have jobs. The
median family income of blacks as
compared with that of whites has im-
proved negligibly, from 54 percent in
1964 to 56 percent in 1981. Women's
earnings during this period have
hovered with maddening consistency
around the figure of 59 percent of
men's earnings.
What Congress and the country
failed to reckon with in 1964 were the
"built-in headwinds" of age-old educa-
tional deprivations, artificial job qualifi-
cations, and diverse exclusionary social
customs.
In the most important single deci-
sion delineating the elements of a Title
VII violation, Griggs v Duke Power
Co., 401 US 424 (1971), the Supreme
Court tackled the problem head-on,
and totally transformed the very con-
cept of "discrimination." Speaking for a
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Burger
declared that Title VII did not merely
outlaw intentional discrimination, or
"disparate treatment." Also forbidden
were facially neutral employment prac-
ices that had a "disparate impact," a
disproportionately adverse effect on
protected groups, unless the practices
could be justified as a matter of "busi-
ness necessity."
Thus a high school diploma or the
passing of a certain IQ test could ordi-
narily not be made a requirement for a
janitor's position, if that would disqual-
ify an inordinate percentage of minority
applicants. But an employer could still
demand that its oecretaries know how
to type, or that any other employee
possess skills that ware genuinely "job
related."
In theory this new approach would
seem unexceptionable. In practice the
substitution of an "effects" standard for
an "intent" standard has led to over a
dozen years of intense litigation and
bureaucratic wrangling. For a while it
even appeared that one unfortunate
casualty of the "disparate impact" doc-
trine would be the banishment of all
job testing from the employment scene.
HeinOnline  -- 63 Mich. B.J. 790 1984
LABOR LAW
Ideally, objective job-related tests
should constitute one of the surest
safeguards for minorities and women
against the subtlest, least discernible
forms of discrimination. By 1978, how-
ever, EEOC was able to join with the
other major federal antidiscrimination
agencies in issuing Uniform Guidelines
on Employee Selection Procedures,
6
which included criteria for validating
the most common types of employ-
ment tests.
The continuing significance of the
intents-effects distinction is most evi-
dent in Robert Vercruysse's paper on
"comparable worth." Although the
Supreme Court has not squarely ad-
dressed the issue, it is increasingly likely
that under Title VII an employer may
not deliberately pay women at a rate
that is out of line with what it pays
men, even though the jobs are not sub-
stantially identical in content and thus
there is no violation of the Equal Pay
Act.7 The hard question is whether an
employer may pay women a substan-
dard wage if it has no intention to dis-
advantage them because of their sex,
but is merely responding to the going
market rate.' The economic implica-
tions of this are staggering.
Similarly, when Constance Et-
tinger discusses an employer's duty to
accommodate the handicapped em-
ployee, or when John Runyan dis-
cusses an employer's claim that a
handicapped employee may have a
greater propensity for injury, what Is at
stake at bottom is the extent to which
an employer must do more than act
with innocence of motive.
And one of the knottier issues con-
fronting Kathleen Bogas and Susan
Fellman is whether an employer should
be held liable for sexual harassment if
an employee's conduct or communica-
tion "of a sexual nature" has the "pur-
pose or effect" of creating an offen-
sive working environment for a fellow
employee.
It may even be that the practical
consequences of such technical pro-
cedural matters as the role of arbitra-
tion in discrimination cases generally,
covered by Barry Brown, or the role of
the jury in age discrimination suits, cov-
ered by Timothy Carroll, will be much
affected by the varying attitudes of dif-
ferent decision-makers toward the sub-
jective state of mind of the respondent,
as distinguished from the objective im-
pact upon the alleged victim.
There is one thorny aspect of dis-
crimination that the articles in this sym-
posium do not touch. If we are to se-
cure genuine equality of job opportu-
nity for the races and the sexes within
the foreseeable future, something more
is plainly needed than the mere prohi-
bition of positive acts of discrimination
and the substitution of a policy of pas-
sive neutrality. "Affirmative action" of
the sort that has been ordered by the
federal courts and federal agencies,
and occasionally undertaken by private
parties on their own, has held out the
greatest promise of success and at the
same time has aroused the fiercest
opposition.
Where a specific statutory violation
on the part of an employer or union
has been found, the courts have gener-
ally been prepared to require "quota"
hiring or similar numerically oriented
remedial action, disposing rather easily
of objections of "reverse discrimina-
tion" against whites or males.' Even
here, however, the Second Circuit has
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and a promotion quota and has de-
clined to sustain the latter as a remedy
when it would constitute "reverse
discrimination" against a relatively
small group of readily identifiableIndividuals. I
In United Steelworkers v Weber,
443 US 192 (1979), the Supreme
Court found valid under Title VII a pri-
vate, voluntary race-conscious affirma-
tive action training program Initiated
pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement in order to eliminate job
segregation In an employer's plants. Af-
firmative action mandated under
Executive Order 11246 as a condition
for securing government contracts, or
voluntarily adopted by a public
employer, raises constitutional ques-
tions not present in Weber.
In Fullilove v Klutznick, 448 US
448 (1980), the Supreme Court up-
held (6-3) the constitutionality of the
Federal Public Works Employment Act
of 1977, which set aside ten percent of
each grant under a short-term program
for "minority business enterprises." But
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congressional authorization for the
challenged program, in direct response
to notorious, long-standing abuses in
the construction industry, factors not
present in the more broadly applicable
Executive Order program.
So far only the courts of ap-
peals,'1 and not the Supreme Court,
have sustained the validity of the latter
program against statutory and constitu-
tional attacks.
This past term, In Firefighters
Local 1784 v Stotts, 52 USLW 4767
(1984), -12 the Supreme Court backed
away from its earlier approval of race-
conscious affirmative action, at least
where It would Impair white workers'
rights under a bona fide seniority
system.
All that was directly at issue in
Stotts was a trial court's power to mod-
ify a consent decree setting minority
hiring and promotion goals in a city fire
department, so as to limit the layoffs of
black firefighters in a subsequent fi-
nancial crisis. The initial settlement
had been reached without a formal
judicial finding of discrimination on
the part of the city, and layoffs were
not mentioned.
Nonetheless, the Court went out
of its way to declare that a court would
not have the authority to disregard
a seniority system even in fashion-
ing a remedy for a proven statutory
violation.
The Court reiterated the rule from
Franks v Bowman Transportation Co.,
424 US 947 (1976), and Teamsters v
United States, 431 US 324 (1977), that
retroactive competitive seniority may
only be awarded to the actual, iden-
tified victims of discrimination, and that
mere membership in the disadvantaged
class is insufficient to warrant a senior-
ity award.
There is no gainsaying the reality
that affirmative action and preferential
treatment in favor of one race or sex
raise grave moral questions, as well as
questions going to the core of Amer-
ican traditions of individual merit and
group neutrality. The essence of affir-
mative action is an effort to achieve jus-
,ice among groups; in ordinary cir-
cumstances the essence of morality and
law alike Is justice among individuals. 13
The Appalachian white or the
white ethnic from a ghetto may person-
ally be far more disadvantaged by
his/her background than the third-
generation offspring of a professional
black family, and yet it is the latter who
will be favored under the usual affirma-
tive action plan. I justify this, not with-
out misgivings, on the ground that we
are dealing with no ordinary situation
but with a national problem of stunning
dimensions. A group wrong has been
perpetrated for generation upon gener-
ation, and the wounds are deep, perva-
sive, and persistent. Heroic measures
are called for in the treatment, specifi-
cally, a group remedy to cure this
group wrong.
Even as we indulge in this strong
medicine, however, we must try to
maintain a clear head. For the sake of
all of us, black and white, male and
female alike, we must not allow the
drug of race-conscious and sex-
conscious behavior to become habit-
forming. Affirmative action must cease
when Its goals have been substantially
accomplished.
Termination of these programs
may not be as difficult as some might
imagine. The common sense, not to
mention self-interest, of society at large
will make itself felt in due course. The
pride of the beneficiaries themselves
will call for an end to favored treatment
when It is no longer needed. Certain
special admissions programs for Orien-
tal students have now been phased out
on the West Coast.
Discrimination lawyers, like den-
tists and cancer researchers, seek the
demise of their own specialties. I am
told by practitioners around the coun-
try that there has already been a
marked decline in class actions involv-
ing race. In a few more decades anti-
discrimination legislation should be as
anachronistic as the Sunday blue laws.
And some happy successor of mine will
be penning a foreword to a symposium
on the mature employment law of that
day, which will doubtless embrace such
subjects as legislation ensuring still
greater economic security and environ-
mental protections for workers, and an
even larger role for them in the gover-
nance of Industrial enterprises.
0
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Cir 1971), cert denied, 406 US 950 (1972);
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eral Contractors v Altschuler, 490 F2d 9 (1st
Cir 1973), cert denied, 416 US 957 (1974).
12. Cf. Bratton v City of Detroit, 704 F2d 878
(6th Cir 1983), cert. denied, 104 S Ct 703
(1984) (voluntary quota promotion program
in city police department).
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of Los Angeles v Manhart, 435 US 702
(1978) (female annuitants must be treated as
individuals instead of components of a sex-







HeinOnline  -- 63 Mich. B.J. 792 1984
